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Issues in the Third Circuit
"I CAN'T WORK JUST KIDDING, I CAN.": THE EFFECTS THAT
APPLYING FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS HAVE ON AN ADA CLAIM
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was signed into law on
July 26, 1990 by President George Bush.' A primary purpose of the ADA is
to protect disabled persons from discrimination in the workplace. 2 This
law followed various government initiatives designed to compensate dis-

abled individuals due to their inability to provide for themselves.3 These
initiatives included the Social Security Act, workers compensation pro4
grams and various disability insurance plans.
1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (providing amended version of statute); Anne E. Beaumont, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop:JudicialEstoppel and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1529, 1541 (1996) (discussing history of
ADA); Richard C. Mariani & Kimberly E. Robertson, Representationof Total Disability
on Claims for Social Security Benefits: Powerful, But Not Conclusive Evidence that the
Claimant Is Not a Qualified Individual with a Disability Under the ADA, 29 U. MEM. L.
REv. 651, 653-54 (1999) (describing basis of ADA law).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (3) (stating "discrimination against individuals
with disabilities persists in such crucial areas as employment"); Christine Neylon
O'Brien, To Tell the Truth: ShouldJudicialEstoppel PrecludeAmericans with Disabilities
Act Complaints?, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 349, 360-64 (1999) (analyzing purpose and
requirements of ADA). See generally Heather Hamilton, JudicialEstoppel, Social Security Disability Benefits and the ADA: The Circuits Diverge, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 127
(1996) (stating Congress' intent to address disabled persons in workforce).
3. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Guidance on the Effect of Applications for Disability Benefits on ADA Claims, EEOC NOTICE 915.002,
6907, 5419-24 (Feb. 12, 1997) (discussing Social Security, workers' compensation
and disability insurance plans) [hereinafter EEOC]; Beaumont, supra note 1, at
1545-50 (discussing purposes of Social Security and workers' compensation laws);
Maureen C. Westman, The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks that Prevent Workers from ObtainingBoth Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protections,26
HOFSTRA L. REv. 377, 388-395 (1997) (discussing purposes behind various disability subsistence benefits).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (B) (1994) (defining disability); EEOC, supra
note 3, at 5419 ("In adding disability as a basis for benefits administered by the
Social Security Administration (SSA) in 1956, Congress recognized society's obligation to provide assistance to people whose disabilities prevent them from achieving
economic self-sufficiency."); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2301, 2304 (1995)
(defining personal injury and requiring employers to pay workers' compensation
to employees injured during course of employment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36
(West 1986) (defining disability for workers' compensation purposes); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 53:5A-10 (West 1986) (showing example of disability insurance plan); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (West 1992) (defining injury for purposes of workers'
compensation); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5422 ("The workers' compensation definitions of 'disability' reflect the purposes of workers' compensation laws. Those laws
provide a system for securing prompt and fair settlement of employees' claims
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When analyzing ADA claims, courts have used the tests and burdens
of proof that developed under other anti-discrimination laws. 5 One significantly litigated issue occurs when a plaintiff, claiming to be "disabled" and
unable to work, applies for disability payments (i.e., social security) and
subsequently files an ADA claim stating that he or she was discriminated
against because of this disability. 6 The apparent conflict exists between
claiming to be unable to work under the disability statute and then filing
an ADA claim, which requires the plaintiff to prove that he or she is qualified and able to do the job.7 Courts often used judicial estoppel to prevent a plaintiff from maintaining an ADA claim after that same plaintiff
had applied for disability benefits and claimed to be unable to work. 8
Part II of this Brief will look at the background of the ADA, disability
statutes and the Third Circuit's prior use of judicial estoppel under ADA
claims where those plaintiffs had also applied for disability payments. 9
Part III will discuss the United States Supreme Court's recent ruling on
this issue, as well as the Third Circuit's subsequent interpretation of that
Supreme Court holding. 10 Finally, Part IV will give a practical analysis of
how attorneys should deal with the issue ofjudicial estoppel in Third Circuit ADA cases.1 1
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Americans with DisabilitiesAct

The ADA was enacted to rectify the problem of discrimination against
disabled persons in the workplace. 12 The ADA prevents employers from
against employers for occupational injury and illness."); Id. at 5423 ("The purpose
of disability insurance plans is to provide partial wage replacements when an employee becomes unable to work as a result of illness, injury, or disease.").
5. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 517 (1993) (discussing
procedures of Title VII discrimination case); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (discussing burden shifting under Tide VII); Mariani &
Robertson, supra note 1, at 655-56 (showing that ADA claims use same shifting of
burdens and procedures as other discrimination statutes).
6. See, e.g., McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing judicial estoppel of ADA claim).
7. See id. at 618 (showing court's belief that statements are inconsistent).
8. See id. (applying judicial estoppel to prevent inconsistent statements).
9. For a discussion of the historical background of the ADA, disability statutes
and case law on judicial estoppel, see infra notes 12-57 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's recent stance on
the issue ofjudicial estoppel in ADA cases, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit's recent interpretation of that Supreme Court holding, see
infra notes 58-133 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of how practitioners in the Third Circuit should analyze
this issue, see infra notes 134-65 and accompanying text. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (a) (3) (1994) (stating "discrimination against individuals with disabilities
persists in such critical areas as employment").
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (3) (1994) (stating "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment").
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discriminatorily hiring or firing disabled persons.1 3 The statute strikes a
balance between unfair prejudice against the disabled, and the employer's
right to maintain high levels of productivity and employ a competent
workforce. 14 The ADA accomplishes this balance by requiring the employer to make "reasonable accommodations" to allow a disabled person
to perform the "essential functions" of a job.1 5 Although, there has been
much litigation as to what constitutes a "disability," "reasonable accommodation" and "essential function," those issues are not pertinent to the pre16
sent discussion.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) ("No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."); Mariani & Robertson, supranote 1, at
653 (discussing basic purpose and standards of ADA).
14. See Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 655 ("Indeed, a person unable
to work is not intended to be, and is not, covered by the ADA." (citing McNemar v.
Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996))).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (making discrimination in workplace applicable when employer fails to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 362 (discussing balance that ADA makes). One
commentator summarized the balance and conflict between unlawful ADA discrimination and an employer's right to effectively run his or her business as
follows:
Under its employment provisions, the ADA allows a disabled person to
sue an employer for failure to hire, or for termination from a present job,
based on disability discrimination. It is difficult, however, to argue that a
person who cannot walk, cannot talk, cannot see, is frequently ill, or even
frequently depressed, does not have an impediment to job performance.
Therefore, the ADA restricts its coverage to those cases where the employer's prejudice can be clearly distinguished from the actual diminished job performance of the disabled. The tool for making this
determination is the concept of "reasonable accommodation."
Id.; accord 42 U.S.C § 12111(9) (defining and giving examples of what constitutes
"reasonable accommodation" under ADA).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (giving examples of reasonable accommodations). The statute states:
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include-making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities; and job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
Id.; see Hamlin v. Charter Township, 165 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing
whether front-line fire fighting is essential function of job of firefighter); Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing whether
reassignment is reasonable accommodation); Pack v. KMart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300,
1305 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 45 (1999) (disagreeing with EEOC
definition of disability); Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 56-57 (1st Cir.
1998) (discussing whether shift rotation was essential function of nursing);
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 783 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (supporting EEOC's definitions of disability); Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265,
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The mechanics of an ADA claim follow the procedures of most antidiscrimination statutes. 17 The plaintiffs prima facie case "must establish
that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he is qualified for the position and can
perform the essential functions of the position with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (3) the employer discriminated against him because of the disability."' 8 The burden of production then shifts to the
defendant employer to produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory business
reason for the employment decision. 1 9 If the employer succeeds, then the
burden of proof shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's
reason was a "pretext" for discrimination. 20 In order to establish pretext,
the employee must show that the employer's explanation is false, and that
21
the real motivation for the decision was discrimination.
B.

Disability Statutes

The most common disability statute used to judicially estop ADA
claims was the Social Security Act ("SSA").22 Other types of disability stat23
utes include workers' compensation laws and disability insurance plans.
While these statutes may have been created for different purposes and use
different criteria than the SSA, they bring up the same issues and
1272 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing issue of reasonable accommodation), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1144 (1999); EEOC COMPLIANCE MANuAL § 902 (defining disability for
ADA purposes); Dennis Levandoski & Sheila Zakren, Has the ADA Got Your Client
Covered?, TRIAL, Oct. 1999, at 35-41 (discussing generally disagreement between
courts as to defining "disabilities," "essential functions" and "reasonable
accommodations").
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) ("The powers, remedies, and procedures set
forth in [Title VII] shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures [of the ADA].");
Levandoski & Zakren, supra note 16, at 38 (noting ADA procedure mirrors Title
VII, but noting ADA cases may place heavier burden on employers).
18. Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 655 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
19. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (identifying
test for Title VII claim); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01
(3d Cir. 1997) (using burden-shifting articulated in Hicks for ADA claim), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1718 (2000); Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 655 (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801).
20. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-10 (developing "pretext" procedure); Krouse, 126
F.3d at 500-01 (endorsing Hicks pretext analysis for ADA claim).
21. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509 (establishing how to prove "pretext"); Krouse,
126 F.3d at 500-01 (adopting Hicks for ADA claim); Mariani & Robertson, supra
note 1, at 656 ("To establish pretext, the plaintiff must come forth with sufficient
evidence to show that (1) a discriminatory reason motivated the employer rather
than the employer's proffered legitimate reason; or (2) the defendant's proffered
explanation is 'unworthy of credence.'").
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994) (establishing Social Security program).
23. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2301, 2304 (1995) (requiring workers' compensation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36 (West 1988) (defining disability for workers'
compensation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:5A-10 (West 1986) (showing example of disability insurance plan); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (West 1992) (defining injury for
purposes of workers' compensation).
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problems regarding judicial estoppel under the ADA,2 4 Disability programs are established to provide income to those individuals who are unable to work for themselves. 25 Commentators have urged that statutes like
the SSA were set up in accordance with stereotypical notions depicting
disabled persons as inferior and unable to provide for themselves. 26 This
characterization contrasts with the ADA's purpose of giving disabled indi27
viduals the equal opportunity to work and provide for themselves.
To receive some type of social security payment (Social Security Disability Insurance, "SSDI," or Supplemental Security Income, "SSI"), an individual must show that his or her physical or mental impairment is "of such
severity that [he or she] is not only unable to do [his or her] previous
work but cannot, considering [his or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy ... ."28 For administrative purposes, the SSA's application process has a five-step inquiry, which allows for general presump24. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 800-05 (1999) (discussing judicial estoppel of ADA claim regarding Social Security benefits); Motley
v. NewJersey State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing judicial
estoppel of ADA claim regarding prior disability insurance plans); Krouse, 126 F.3d
at 498 (discussing judicial estoppel of ADA claims in regards to workers' compensation); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5418 ("The definitions of the terms used in the
Social Security Act, state workers' compensation laws, disability insurance plans,
and other disability benefits programs are tailored to the purposes of those laws
and programs. Therefore, representations made under those laws and programs
are not determinative of coverage under the ADA.").
25. See EEOC, supra note 3, at 5419 (" [The Social Security Act's] purpose is to
provide a basic level of financial support for people who, because of disability,
cannot support themselves."). The purposes of workers' compensation laws are
similar. See id. at 5422 (discussing purpose of workers' compensation laws is to
provide prompt compensation for employees injured at work). The purposes of
disability statutes also do not mirror the purposes of the ADA. See id. at 5423 ("The
purpose of disability insurance plans is to provide partial wage replacement when
an employee becomes unable to work as a result of illness, injury, or disease.").
26. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 360 (discussing history of SSA). One commentator discussed the somewhat stereotypical justification for SSDI as follows:
[D]isabled individuals were institutionalized and treated as deranged or
incompetent, a practice which continued well into the 1970s. The disabled were included with the homeless, the desperately poor, and the
insane, as objects of charity for whom society had an obligation to provide
support. Not until 1956 did the government add those with disabilities to
the Social Security programs through the creation of SSDI. This program
did not radically depart from the historic presumptions and stereotypes
about the disabled. It provided federal financial assistance to those who,
by accident of birth, trauma, or disease, were unable to provide for
themselves.
Id.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (listing findings and purposes of Congress in
enacting ADA); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 361 (noting purpose of SSA was "not to
rectify employment misunderstandings").
28. Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 657; accord 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d) (2) (A) (1994) (defining what level of disability is needed to obtain Social
Security benefits).
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tions as to whether an individual is disabled under the statute. 29 Under
this inquiry, there is no factual assessment of the disabilities of each individual or of the essential functions or requirements of each particular
job.3 0 For example, an individual who has the HIV virus or is blind has a
"listed" disability under the five-step analysis and is automatically eligible
for disability payments. 31 There is also no inquiry into whether the applicant's former employer can make "reasonable accommodations" so as to
allow the applicant to continue employment.3 2 These are just a few examples illustrating that the purposes, procedures and definitions used in
33
other disability statutes do not necessarily mirror those of the ADA.

29. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1999) (giving five-step analysis to be used by
Social Security Administration in determining whether applicant should be
granted Social Security benefits); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5520-21 (listing five questions to be asked in application for benefits); Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at
657-58 (describing application evaluation). Specifically, the five-step analysis asks:
(1) Is the claimant currently engaging in "substantial gainful activity"? (If
the answer is yes, the claim is denied; if the answer is no, the claim continues to the next step.)
(2) Does the claimant have a "severe" impairment? (If the answer is no,
the claim is denied; if the claimant has an impairment that significantly
limits his/her ability to work-that is, it is "severe"-the claim continues
to step 3.)
(3) Does the claimant have an impairment that is equivalent to any impairment the SSA has listed as so severe that it automatically preclude
substantial gainful activity? (If the claimant has an impairment that is
medically the equivalent of a listed impairment, the claimant is presumed
disabled by the SSA and benefits are granted; if the claimant does not
have a listed impairment, the claim proceeds to step 4.)
(4) Does the impairment prevent the claimant from performing his/her
.past relevant work"? (If the claimant can perform his/her past relevant
work, the claim is denied; if the claimant cannot perform such work, the
claim continues to step 5.)
(5) Does the impairment prevent the claimant from performing any
other type of work? (If the SSA determines that the claimant is able to
perform work which exists in the national economy, the claim is denied;
if the SSA determines that the claimant is unable to perform other work,
considering his/her age, education, and past work experience, benefits
are granted.)
EEOC, supra note 3, at 5420-21.
30. See EEOC, supra note 3, at 5415-16 (discussing non-fact specific generalizations used under SSA that are in contrast to factual inquiries made under ADA).
31. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 2.00(A), 14.00(D) (listing visual
impairments and HIV infections as diseases that automatically allow Social Security
benefits to be awarded).
32. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999) (stating
major difference between ADA cases and SSA decision is that SSA does not analyze
issue of "reasonable accommodation").
33. See generally EEOC, supra note 3 (discussing justifications for abandoning
use of judicial estoppel in ADA claims).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss4/2

6

Bisordi: I Can't Work, Just Kidding, I Can: The Effects That Applying for

20001

CASEBRIEF

633

C. Historical Use ofJudicial Estoppel of ADA Claims in the Third Circuit
The language of the ADA is silent regarding the significance of a
plaintiffs assertions of total disability under another statute.3 4 Thus, the
courts are left to resolve the apparent conflict between the statutes: the
plaintiff, on the one hand, wants social security disability payments because he or she is unableto work and, on the other hand, claims that he or
she was discriminated against because he or she is able to work. 35 The
circuit courts have used different versions of judicial estoppel, or "preclusion of inconsistent positions," to dismiss ADA claims because of the apparent conflict.3 6 This section takes a brief look at how the Third Circuit
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17 (1994) (failing to indicate Congress' intent as to
effect of prior assertions of disability on ADA claims).
35. See Westman, supra note 3, at 401 ("[The SSA and ADA] statutes... are
silent as to their impact on each other.").
36. See Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.3d 500, 503-05 (7th Cir. 1999) (estopping claim because of inconsistent positions, but noting SSA application does not
conclusively result in estoppel); Flowers v. Komatsu Mining Sys., Inc., 165 F.3d 544,
557 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding benefits not relevant to this particular ADA case);
McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1998)
(using "rebuttable presumption" standard); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp.,
120 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1998) (creating "rebuttable presumption" standard),
rev'd, 526 U.S. 795, 802-06 (1999); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376,
381-82 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding ADA claims not automatically barred because of
prior disability statement), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144 (1999); Downs v. Hawkeye
Health Serv., Inc., 148 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 1998) (requiring "strong countervailing evidence" of being qualified individual when prior statement seems contradictory); Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding plaintiff's evidence could not overcome prior statement of being unable
to work), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 589 (1999); Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361,
1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying plaintiffs claim because of inconsistent claims
under summary judgement, but noting judicial estoppel may be appropriate when
plaintiff's inconsistent statements "amount to an affront of the court"); Aldrich v.
Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding payment of private
disability benefits does not automatically bar ADA claim, but may be relevant to
determining plaintiff's status as "qualified individual"); Rascon v. US West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding SSA benefits don't
automatically estop ADA claim, but are relevant); Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133
F.3d 1419, 1423 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating use of judicial estoppel depends on particular facts of each case including specific statements made in disability benefits
application); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)
(discussing disagreement over judicial estoppel in realm of ADA claims); Blanton
v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 123 F.3d 916, 917 (6th Cir. 1997) (refusing to adopt per se
use ofjudicial estoppel); McCreary v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159, 1164
(7th Cir. 1997) (finding disability claim is not conclusive in estopping ADA claim);
Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding benefits
relevant, but not conclusive and denied use of estoppel); Dush v. Appleton Elec.
Co., 124 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997) (prior statement showed plaintiff was unable
to work for ADA purposes); Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir.
1997) (holdingjudicial estoppel in ADA claim is not automatically used because of
prior disability statement, but depends on facts of each case); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding sworn
statement as to disability was relevant to case, but not relevant for purposes of
summary judgment), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 614 (1999); D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs.
Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (refusing to estop plaintiff); McNemar v. Disney
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used judicial estoppel to deal with the conflicting statements made under
37
the ADA and disability statutes.

Judicial estoppel was developed to "protect the integrity of the courts
by 'preventing parties from playing fast and loose with the courts in assuming inconsistent positions."' 38 The Third Circuit developed a two-part inStore, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996) (estopping plaintiff's ADA claim);
Budd v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 103 F.3d 699, 700 (8th Cir. 1996) (granting summary
judgment against plain'tiff because SSDI application demonstrated he was unable
to work); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting
summary judgment because plaintiff's SSDI application and doctor's testimony indicated an inability to work); August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 584
(1st Cir. 1992) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff bound by statements
made for disability benefits); Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190,1196 (7th Cir. 1992)
(refusing to use judicial estoppel because SSA statute and ADA can coexist, though
SSA claim is relevant to determine seriousness of handicap); Mariani & Robertson,
supra note 1, at 665-72 (discussing circuit split). One commentator summarized
the difference of opinion as follows:
[T] he ADA and the SSA, when read together, appear to clearly provide a
"window" for some persons to pursue claims under the ADA-despite
having represented that they are "totally disabled," as they must, to qualify for SSA benefits. While there did not seem to be any real dispute
among the circuits as to whether this window existed, there was a dispute
as to how wide open it should be. On the one side, the Third and Fifth
Circuits considered the window to be barely cracked. On the other side,
the District of Columbia Circuit, like the EEOC, considered the window
to be wide open. The First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits took positions in between the two sides.
Id. at 665-66; accord Hamilton, supra note 2, at 137-49 (discussing circuit split by
categorizing circuits into three approaches); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 353 n.21
(noting various circuit approaches to EEOC's position that judicial estoppel
should not be used);Jorge M. Leon, Note, Two Hats, One Head: ReconcilingDisability
Benefits and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 1139, 114753 (1997) (discussing disagreement among circuits).
37. See, e.g., Krouse, 126 F.3d at 498; McNemar, 91 F.3d at 616-19.
38. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 134-35 (citing McNemar); see Lawrence B. Solum, Caution! Estoppel Ahead: Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 32
Lov. L.A. L. REv. 461, 474-95 (1999) (discussing history and purpose of judicial
estoppel); Kimberly Jane Houghton, Comment, Having Total Disability and Claiming It, Too: The EEOC's Position Against the Use of JudicialEstoppel in Americans with
DisabilitiesAct Cases May Hurt More than It Helps, 49 ALA. L. REv. 645, 650 (1998)
(discussing purposes ofjudicial estoppel). Judicial estoppel has been applied in a
variety of contexts, but as commentators and courts have noted, decisions that use
judicial estoppel usually have the following five factors present:
(1) The two positions must be taken by the same party; (2) the positions
must be taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3)
the record of the two proceedings must clearly reflect that the party to be
estopped intended the triers of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged in support of the positions; (4) the party taking the positions must
have been succeeded in maintaining the first position and must have received some benefit thereby in the first proceeding; (5) the two positions
must be totally inconsistent.
Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 351,357 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (quoting Departmentof
Trans. v. Grawe, 447 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)). See Hamilton, supra note
2, at 135 (discussing use of estoppel); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 357 (citing Muellner
to summarize traditional elements present when judicial estoppel is invoked).
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quiry to determine whether the courts should estop a plaintiff from
asserting conflicting positions. 39 First, the plaintiff must actually assert inconsistent positions. 40 Second, the plaintiff must have made the inconsistency in "bad faith-i.e., with intent to play fast and loose with the
41
court."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's most significant application of judicial estoppel to an ADA claim occurred in
43
42
In that case, the plaintiff was HIV positive.
McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc.
The employer stated that the employee was dismissed because he had
taken cash from the store register. 44 After McNemar was dismissed, he
applied for and received Social Security benefits, NewJersey state disability
payments and a disability exemption from his student loan from the Pennsylvania Higher Education Agency. 45 In his effort to receive these benefits, McNemar and his physicians swore "under penalty of perjury that he
has been totally and permanently disabled and unable to work" for a pe46
riod beginning five weeks before his dismissal.
The Third Circuit used judicial estoppel to uphold the lower court's
granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer. 4 7 The court
found that the purpose of judicial estoppel is "to protect the integrity of
the courts" and believed estoppel was needed in cases like McNemar's to
39. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 618 (discussing Ryan test); Krouse, 126 F.3d at 501
(citing Third Circuit's two-part test for use of judicial estoppel); Ryan Operations
G.P. v. Santium-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1996) (articulating
two part analysis to be used in Third Circuit judicial estoppel cases); Scarano v.
Central R.R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953) (establishing concern of litigants "playing 'fast and loose with the courts'").
40. See Ryan, 81 F.3d at 361 (developing test).
41. Id. According to the Third Circuit, "O]udicial estoppel, sometimes called
the 'doctrine against the assertion of inconsistent positions,' is a judge-made doctrine ....
It is not intended to eliminate all inconsistencies, however slight or
inadvertent; rather, it is designed to prevent litigants from 'playing 'fast and loose
with the courts."" Id. at 358 (citing Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513).
42. 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
43. See id. at 613 (discussing facts of case).
44. See id. at 614-15 (showing formal company policy of discharge for such
infractions, and statement from high ranking personnel officers "that McNemar
should not be penalized less severely than other employees in similar situations
simply because of his disclosure [that he was HIV positive]").
45. See id. at 615-16 (noting statements made in connection with applications
for all three programs).
46. See id. at 615 (stating his doctors indicated that he was totally disabled and
unable to work for period beginning five weeks before his discharge).
47. See id. at 617 (upholding district court's use of estoppel because its use was
within the court's discretion); McNemar v. Disney Stores, Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-6997,
1995 WL 390051, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1995) (stating "it is the province of the
legislature rather than this Court to authorize such a double recovery ....
This
Court fails to understand how the ADA's goals would be thwarted by rejecting the
principles ofjudicial estoppel in this case.").
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prevent plaintiffs from "'speak[ing] out of both sides of [their] mouth
with equal vigor and credibility before [the] court."' 48
The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case
because the assertions made under the disability statutes indicating an inability to work showed that the plaintiff was not a "qualified" individual
under the ADA. 49 Further, the court believed that the purpose of the disability statute was not to give benefits to individuals who were capable of
working and providing for themselves. 50 Also, the court rejected the notion that there was a significant difference in the definitions of disability
under the statutes.5 ' The court put little weight on the fact that AIDS was
a "presumptive disability" or the fact that no fact-sensitive investigation
into the plaintiff's condition or job requirements were necessary under
the SSA. 52 Instead, the court emphasized the fact that the plaintiff had
made his previous statements of his inability to work to the United States,
48. McNemar, 91 F.3d at 616, 618 (quoting Reigel v. KaiserFound. Health Plan,
859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994)).
49. See id. at 618-19 (upholding district court's finding that plaintiff failed to
make prima facie case). In invoking judicial estoppel, the court noted that it had
not had the opportunity to invoke the doctrine in an ADA claim. See id. (noting
that Third Circuit had not previously applied judicial estoppel to similar facts).
The court, however, agreed with the district court that at that time, "'most federal
courts agree that an employee who represents on a benefits application that he is
disabled is judicially estopped from arguing that he is qualified to perform the
duties of the position involved."' Id. at 618 (quoting McNemar, 1995 WL 390051, at
*3). The court relied on several other federal cases that supported its use ofjudicial estoppel. See id. at 619 (listing other decisions that supported use of judicial
estoppel in context of ADA claims); August v. Offices Unlimited., Inc., 981 F.2d
576, 582-84 (1st Cir. 1992) (denying plaintiff opportunity to claim to be "qualified
individual" after claiming to be "totally disabled" in applying for disability benefits); Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, 873 F. Supp. 547, 554 (D. Kan. 1995) (estopping
ADA claim after plaintiff applied for long-term disability benefits); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., No. CV 94-5344, 1994 WL 740765, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1994)
(estopping plaintiff who claimed to be completely disabled); Reigel, 859 F. Supp.
at 967-70 (estopping plaintiff under ADA claim because of previous assertion of
disability). The court found little significance in a case relied upon by the plaintiff
to prevent invocation of judicial estoppel. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 619 n.8 (rejecting Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992) where court refused to
preclude plaintiffs claim under Rehabilitation Act of being qualified to work despite prior SSA determination). The court noted that the present case was distinguishable from Overton because there was evidence that the plaintiff in Overton had
actually worked despite the disability and because Overton did not expressly deal
with judicial estoppel. See id. (finding little precedential value in Overton). More
important, the court found Overton to be of little value because the Seventh Circuit
subsequently invoked judicial estoppel in another similar case. See id. (citing
DeGuiseppe v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1995)).
50. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 620 (finding no indication that Congress or New
Jersey legislature intended to give disability benefits to those who could work and
any "double recovery" should be authorized by legislation).
51. See id. (rejecting argument that definitions of disability are different).
52. See id. (finding presumptions irrelevant because plaintiff still had to say
"under penalty of perjury that he was physically unable to work").
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New Jersey and Pennsylvania governments all under the threat of
53
perjury.
The decision in McNemar generated a considerable amount of criticism from academics and other circuits. 5 4 Generally, the decision was perceived to adopt a per se rule that individuals claiming some sort of total
disability were judicially estopped from making their prima facie case of
being a "qualified individual" under the ADA. 5 5 As a result, district courts
throughout the Third Circuit upheld McNemar as the law, but many courts
factually distinguished the cases. 56 This was especially true after the Court
53. See id. (stressing penalty of perjury as justification for estoppel).
54. See Rascon v. US West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1330-32
(10th Cir. 1998) (noting McNemar, but refusing to adoptjudicial estoppel); Krouse
v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502-03 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997) (showing
McNemar has been subject of considerable criticism); Swanks v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (disagreeing with Third
Circuit's reasoning); Smith v. Lindenmeyr Paper Co., No.CIV.A. 95-3973, 1997 WL
312077, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1997) (noting criticism of decision and believing Third Circuit will soon readdress issue); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5425 (finding
McNemar holding "especially troubling"); Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at
670 (noting McNemar has been "subject to some criticism"); O'Brien, supra note 2,
at 357 (criticizing McNemar as not being consistent with use of judicial estoppel);
Solum, supra note 38, at 495 (urging Supreme Court to reject use ofjudicial estoppel); Westman, supranote 3, at 423-24 (analyzing why judicial estoppel should not
be used in ADA cases); Marney Collins Sims, Comment, 34 Hous. L. REV. 843, 870
(1997) (criticizing use of estoppel).
55. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting perception that McNemar adopted a per se rule); Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co.,
124 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating McNemar adopted 'Judicial estoppel as a
per se bar"); Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1441-42
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (perceiving McNemaras per se bar); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5425
(disapproving of McNemar because there was no "individualized inquiry mandated
by the ADA"); Regina M. Grattan, Putting the Remedial Back into Remedy: A Rejection of
JudicialEstoppelfor ADA ClaimantsReceiving Social Security Disability Benefits, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 836, 838 (1998) ("The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the receipt of disability benefits automatically bars a claim under the
ADA."); Robert C. Ludolph & Barbara Eckert Buchanan, Second Thoughts on Conflicting Disability Representations and Handicap Claims: Heads You Win Tails You Lose,
77 MICH. Bus L.J. 1054, 1058 (1998) (comparing McNemar with other courts that
did not adopt per se rule).
56. See Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529, 1548 (3d Cir. 1997)
(analogizing McNemar ADA use of estoppel to claim under Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act); Dayoub v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 486, 490-91 &
n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (questioning and distinguishing case from McNemar); Daliessio
v. Depuy, Inc., No.CIV.A. 96-5295, 1998 WL 24330, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 1998)
(casting doubt as to validity of McNemar); Mensah v. Resources for Human Dev.,
No. 97-2517, 1997 WL 792901, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1997) (distinguishing
McNemar); Marsaglia v. L. Beinhauer & Son, Co., 987 F. Supp. 425, 429-30 nn.4-5
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (upholding use ofjudicial estoppel while also taking into account
concerns that are basis of criticism); Lindenmeyr Paper Co., 1997 WL 312077, at
*4 & n.5 (upholding use of judicial estoppel because of McNemar holding, even
though criticism of McNemarwas noted); DeJoy v. Comcast Cable Communications
Inc., 968 F. Supp. 963, 983 (D.N.J. 1997) (following McNemar, but did not invoke
judicial estoppel because facts were different); Erit v. Judge, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 774,
779 (D.N.J. 1997) (preventing inconsistent statements by using judicial estoppel).
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit later, in dicta, expressed concern that the
criticism of McNemar may suggest that the case was wrongly decided and
57
that the court should re-evaluate the issue as soon as possible.
III.

A.

RECENT CASES

The U.S. Supreme Court's Stance

Due to the disagreement among the circuits and the criticism of decisions like McNemar, the United States Supreme Court finally settled the
issue of how to apply judicial estoppel under the ADA in Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corp.58 The case settles any conflict among the circuits
as to what test to apply.5 9 Nevertheless, how the circuits apply the test may
60
differ.
1. Facts
Carolyn Cleveland worked at Policy Management Systems. 6 1 Her job
was to do background checks on prospective employees. 62 Cleveland suffered a stroke, which injured her memory, concentration and speaking
skills. 63 She took a leave of absence and three weeks later applied for

SSDI payments, claiming to be unable to work. 64 Approximately three
months later her condition improved and her physician cleared her to
return to work; at which time, she began to work for Policy Management
again. 65 She reported this development to the Social Security Administration. 6 6 Three months later, her application was denied because she had
57. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 502-03 (noting criticism of McNemar, but refusing to
address issue of whether it was correctly decided, because plaintiff did not need to
prove he was "qualified individual"). The opinion stated 'Judge Becker is persuaded by the authorities [criticizing McNemar] that McNemar was wrongly decided,
and believes that the court should reconsider it at its first opportunity." Id. at 503
n.4. After Krouse, several district court opinions questioned whether McNemar was
still good law. See Dayoub, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 490 ("[The] Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has cast doubt on the continuing validity of McNemar."); Daliessio,
1998 WL 24330, at *6 (casting doubt on McNemar after Krouse).
58. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
59. See id. at 800 (granting certiorari to settle "disagreement among the Circuits about the legal effect upon an ADA suit of the application for, or receipt of,
disability benefits").
60. See Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 666 ("Although [the prior circuits' tests] may have been effectively overruled by Cleveland, [the prior approaches] nevertheless provide a preview as to how the courts of appeals may
determine when a plaintiffs explanation is 'sufficient' [under Cleveland].").
61. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 799 (discussing facts of case); Employment: Otherwise Qualified, 23 MENTAL & PH-isicAL DISAaIL-rv L. REP. 532, 532-33 (1999) (discussing facts and holding of case) [hereinafter Employment].
62. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 799 (noting plaintiff began job in August).
63. See id. (stating stroke occurred on Jan. 7, 1994).
64. See id. (claiming to be "disabled" and "unable to work").
65. See id. (noting plaintiffs improved condition).
66. See id. (noting disclosure two weeks after plaintiff returned to work).
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begun working again. 67 Four days after the denial of social security bene68
fits, Policy Management fired her.
Two months after the dismissal, Cleveland asked the Social Security
Administration to reconsider her application. 69 She stated, "I was terminated due to my condition and I have not been able to work since. I continue to be disabled." 70 She also noted that she tried to return to work for
a brief time, but "Policy Management Systems terminated her because she
'could no longer do the job' in light of her 'condition.' 71 Ultimately,
Cleveland was awarded benefits retroactively to the day she had the
stroke. 72 Two weeks before the Social Security Administration made the
benefits decision, Cleveland filed an ADA lawsuit claiming "Policy Management Systems had 'terminat[ed]' her employment without reasonably 'accommodat[ing] her disability.' 73 Specifically, she stated that she had
asked for additional training and extra time to complete her work, but
74
that the employer denied these requests.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
refused to hear the merits of Cleveland's ADA claim because the court felt
her application and receipt of SSDI benefits demonstrated that she was
totally disabled. 75 Therefore, she was estopped from claiming she was a
"qualified individual" who could perform the "essential functions" of the
job.76 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer. 77 The standard used by the court was that an application for disability benefits creates a "rebuttable presumption that the claimant ...is judicially estopped
from asserting that he is a 'qualified individual with a disability.'" 7 8 The
court noted that the continued claims of total disability created this presumption, and Cleveland failed to produce any evidence to rebut that pre-

67. See id. (discussing facts of case).
68. See id. (noting plaintiffs dismissal).
69. See id. (noting plaintiff's new statement).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. (noting SSA's granting of disability benefits to Cleveland).
73. Id.
74. See id. (discussing which reasonable accommodations Cleveland was
denied).
75. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 1997),

affg Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 3:95-CV-2140-H. (N.D. Tex. 1997), vacated by 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
76. See id. at 518-19 (affirming district court holding that granted summary
judgment against plaintiff because she failed to show she was "qualified individual"
under ADA).
77. See id. at 519 (affirming analysis of district court).
78. Id. at 518.
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sumption. 79 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
proper use of judicial estoppel in an ADA case.8 0
2.

Analysis

A unanimous United States Supreme Court held that the presumptive
rule developed by the Fifth Circuit was incorrect.a' The Court believed
that the negative presumption was the result of the lower court's belief
that the Social Security statute and the ADA could not comfortably exist
side by side because they "inherently conflict."8 2 The Supreme Court felt
otherwise and stated there are several reasons why the two statutes can
"comfortably exist side by side" and are not "wholly inconsistent," therefore concluding that the negative presumption leading to judicial estoppel
83
was incorrect.
The first reason proffered by the Court was that the determination of
whether an individual qualifies for Social Security disability benefits does
not take into account reasonable accommodations that an employer could
make which would enable a disabled person to continue working.8 4 An
ADA claim, however, does look at whether the employee could perform
the essential functions of his or her job with reasonable accommodations. 85 Therefore, "an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff can perform
herjob with reasonable accommodation may well prove consistent with an
SSDI claim that the plaintiff could not perform her own job (or other

86
jobs) without it."

Secondly, the Court believed that the highly impersonal and formal
way in which SSDI claims are administered showed that the statutes are
79. See id. ("Cleveland continuously and unequivocally represented to the SSA

that she is totally disabled and completely unable to work. As her statements are
unambiguous and previously uncontroverted, she cannot now be heard to complain that she could perform the essential functions of her job.").
80. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 800 (granting certiorari to settle disagreement among circuits).
81. See id. at 802-03 (holding courts should not apply any type of presumption
in cases like Cleveland).
82. See id. at 802 (explaining reasoning for lower court's use of estoppel, that
plaintiff is making inherently contradictory statements, namely "I am too disabled
to work" and "I am not too disabled to work").
83. See id. at 802-03 (stating "there are too many situations in which a SSDI
claim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side").
84. See id. at 803 (noting reasonable accommodation language present in
ADA claims, but not necessary in SSDI determination); see also Employment, supra
note 61, at 533 (explaining justifications used by Court); Disability Estoppel Rule
Rejected, 14 FED. LITIGATOR 170 (1999) (discussing reasoning of Court); EEOC,
supra note 3, at 5426-28 (urging same rationale prior to Supreme Court decision);
Selected Labor & Employment Law Updates 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 369, 369-70
(1999) (discussing holding and rationale of Court) [hereinafter Employment Law
Updates].

85. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9) (B) (1994) (listing possible examples of reasonable accommodations for ADA claims).
86. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803.
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not necessarily inconsistent.8 7 As already discussed, the five-step process
of a SSDI application is very categorical and does not involve individualized assessments of a person's particular disabilities or of the individual's
particular job requirements. 88 The large number of SSDI applications requires such a process, but the simplification is different than the highly
fact-specific application of an ADA claim.89
The Court went on to stress that disability benefits can continue even
after an individual has returned to work.9 0 Accordingly, the payment of
benefits does not always mean an individual is, or is claiming to be, totally
unable to work.9 1 Also, the Court noted that an individual's disability
might worsen over time. 92 Therefore, a person who seeks disability benefits may make statements that do not reflect his or her condition at the
93
time of the earlier employment decision bringing rise to the ADA claim.
The Court thought these were also justifications as to why statements
made under a disability application do not "inherently conflict" with an
94
ADA prima facie case.
Finally, the Court reasoned that when an individual has merely applied for, but has not received any disability payment, the alleged inconsistencies are just a normal part of the legal system.9 5 Rules of civil
procedure allow a party to set forth several different claims in order to
seek a remedy.96 Parties are often allowed to argue in the alternative or
87. See id. at 804 (noting the presumptions and procedures used by SSA are
further examples of how benefits applications can "comfortably exist" and are not
"inherently inconsistent" with ADA claims).
88. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2000) (developing five-step procedure to be
used by SSA which includes list of "presumptive disabilities" that do not require
factual inquiries into applicant's particular characteristics).
89. See EEOC, supra note 3, at 5424 ("Unlike the definitions under other statutory and contractual schemes, which permit generalized inquiries, the definition
of 'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA always requires an individualized inquiry into the ability of a particular person to meet the requirements of a
particular position."); Employment, supra note 61, at 533 (discussing rationale of
Court).
90. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 422(c), 423(e) (1) (1994) (allowing Social Security benefits to continue during "trial work" period); Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805 (noting possibility of individuals receiving benefits while also being gainfully employed).
91. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805 (stating "the SSA sometimes grants SSDI
benefits to individuals, who not only can work, but are working").
92. See id. (noting timing is factor that can allow plaintiff to receive SSDI benefits, while also holding valid ADA claim).
93. See id. (noting change in condition is possible reason why statutes can
coexist).
94. See id. (giving justifications why ADA claim can coexist with disability
benefits).
95. See id. (stating alternative theories are normal part of American legal
system).
96. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2) (permitting party to "set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternatively ...

[and] state as many separate

claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency").
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hypothetically.9 7 Therefore, there should be no different rule when parties are arguing for disability payments and, in the alternative, for a rem98
edy of an ADA violation.
As a result, the Court concluded that there should neither be a per se
use of judicial estoppel nor should there even be a rebuttable presumption in this type of ADA case. 99 The Court did conclude, however, that the
plaintiff could not simply ignore the previous statement made regarding
the disability benefits.' 00 Instead, the plaintiff must offer a "sufficient explanation" to resolve the contradiction.10 ' Otherwise, claiming to be "totally disabled" without an explanation would negate an essential element
102
of the plaintiffs prima facie case.
According to the Court, "[t]o defeat summary judgment, that explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that,
assuming the truth of, or the plaintiffs good faith belief in, the earlier
statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the essential functions' of herjob, with or without 'reasonable accommodation." ' 103 Specifically, Cleveland's brief stated that the prior statements "'were made in a
forum which does not consider the effect that reasonable workplace accommodations would have on the ability to work."'" 0 4 Also, Cleveland explained that at the time the statements were made, she was totally
disabled, but that was not the case at the time of the employment decision. 10 5 The Court remanded the case under this standard to give the
parties the opportunity to contest these two explanations of the
inconsistency, 106
B.

The Third Circuit's Interpretation

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently had
the opportunity to apply Cleveland to another ADA case in Motley v. New
97. See id. (allowing alternative pleadings).
98. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805 (ruling ADA/SSDI alternative theories
should be no different than normal civil pleadings).
99. See id. (refusing to adopt any sort of legal presumption in ADA cases involving plaintiffs who receive Social Security benefits).
100. See id. at 805-06 (explaining that in some situations benefits application
statement may turn out to actually contradict ADA).
101. See id. at 804-06 (requiring explanation sufficient enough to explain inconsistency and survive summary judgment).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (placing burden on plaintiff to prove he
or she is qualified individual capable of performing essential function ofjob with
or without reasonable accommodations).
103. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807.
104. Id.
105. See id. (stating truth of benefits statements at time of application, but not
necessarily true prior to that at time of termination).
106. See id. (remanding case to determine case on merits); Cleveland v. Policy
Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 195 F.3d 803, 803 (5th Cir. 1999) (remanding case to district
court).
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643

Jersey State Police.10 7 The court found that the plaintiff had failed to offer a
sufficient explanation for the inconsistent statements to survive summary
judgment.
1. Facts of Motley
Motley was a NewJersey State Police Officer who was injured in 1990
when an accused drug dealer dragged him 150 feet with his car and then
crashed into a pole after a drug bust had gone astray. Motley was put on
limited duty due to his injuries Prior to his injuries, Motley had been promoted to Detective II in 1989.
NewJersey mandates that all its officers take an annual physical examination.10 8 A poor performance in a physical examination prevents officers from being promoted. 10 9 After the injuries to his knees, back, neck,
shoulder and eye, Motley never performed successfully at a physical examination.1 10 As a result, Motley never received a promotion to Detective I.
Motley filed a grievance because he was not recommended for promotion
in 1991. Nothing ever came of that grievance, however, and he was not
recommended for a promotion again in 1992 or 1993.
At this time, Motley tried to obtain an accidental disability pension.
NewJersey grants this benefit if a police officer can get a medical board to
state that the officer is "permanently and totally disabled . . . and . ..

physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duties."1 1 ' Motley succeeded in obtaining the disability pension because a medical board
stated that he was both permanently and totally disabled and unable to
perform the duties of a New Jersey State Police Officer. 11 2 After obtaining
the disability pension, Motley commenced an action under the ADA and
New Jersey's equivalent state provision.1 1 3 The district court, however,
found that Motley was judicially estopped from claiming he was qualified
for the job because of his previous statements made to obtain the disability
1 14
pension.
107. 196 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 1999).
108. See id. (noting purpose of exam is to be able to handle violent
confrontations).
109. See id. (stating temporary disabilities were decided on case-by-case basis).
110. See id. (indicating plaintiffs failure of exam or refusal to participate).
111. Id. (quoting NewJersey statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:5a-10 (West 1986)
(setting out requirements for retirement benefits to New Jersey State Police Officers injured on the job, including a medical determination that applicant is "permanently and totally disabled").
112. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 163 (noting continued payment of benefits to
plaintiff).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (stating general rule of employment under
ADA); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1, 4.1 (West 1986) (creating New Jersey "Law
Against Discrimination" and including prohibitions of discrimination against
handicapped persons in employment).
114. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 162 (affirming district court's decision to grant
summary judgment).
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Analysis

A majority of the appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling.
The opinion stated that though the plaintiff was not estopped from bringing the claim, the defendant was simply not entitled to survive summary
15
judgment.1
The court took the opportunity to discuss the implication of its prior
holding in McNemar.' 6 The court noted the criticism McNemar had received from courts and commentators because the decision was taken to
stand for a per se application of judicial estoppel in ADA cases where a
plaintiff had previously claimed to be totally disabled and unable to
work. l1 7 The court indicated that such a reading of McNemar was incorrect; the holding was meant to follow the traditional two-part test of judicial estoppel and "each case [should] be decided on its own particular
facts and circumstances."" 8 Nevertheless, the opinion clarified that Cleveland has settled any controversy over a per se rule and has shown that
judicial estoppel should not be used. The question of whether sufficient
explanations exist for apparent inconsistencies shall be made on a case-bycase basis.' 19
The Cleveland holding has been interpreted and applied to all types of
disability statutes, not just to Social Security applications.' 20 In Motley, the
Cleveland holding was applied to a New Jersey law that granted disability
payments to police officers who were unable to perform their previous
duties due to job-related injuries.' 2 ' The court focused the majority of its
analysis on the fact that Cleveland stands for the proposition that differences in statutory standards alone will not suffice to explain inconsistent
115. See id. (declining to use judicial estoppel, instead using traditional summaryjudgement analysis); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 374 (noting Cleveland's holding
requires only sufficient explanation to survive traditional notions of summary judgment); Employment Law Updates, supra note 84, at 371 (describing holding of Cleve-

land as preventing use or presumptions under judicial estoppel, but requiring
sufficient explanations under summary judgment standard).
116. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 163-64.
117. See id. at 163 (discussing reasons for criticism and citing Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997)). For a discussion of the
criticism received by the McNemar decision, see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
118. Motley, 196 F.3d at 163 ("We stated that the application should not be
formulaic, but should follow the framework set out in our decisions, most notably
in Ryan OperationsG.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996).").
119. See id. at 164 n.4 (indicating Cleveland as governing standard).
120. See Peggy R. Mastroianni, Instructions for Field Offices: Analyzing ADA
ChargesAfter Supreme Court DecisionsAddressing "Disabilities"and "Qualified",615 PLI/
LIT. 313, 332 (1999) ("The analysis by the Supreme Court to compare an application for SSDI benefits and a CP's claim that s/he is 'qualified' also would apply to
applications for other types of disability benefits, such as Long Term Disability
benefits or workers' compensation.").
121. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 53:5A-10(a) (West 1994) (granting benefits to hand-

icapped state troopers).
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statements.1 22 Instead, there must be an additional justification for the
difference in context-related legal conclusions that appear to contradict
each other. 123 The court also focused on the fact that Motley's injuries
were extremely detailed and his assertion of being "totally and permanently disabled" was "not a mere blanket statement of complete disability
checked on a box in order to obtain pension benefits."1 24 Additionally,
the court noted that a medical board examined and diagnosed Motley as
125
being "totally and permanently incapacitated for police officer duties."
The attainment of benefits is certainly evidence that an individual has
not made a prima facie showing under the ADA.' 26 The difference in
statutory standards alone will not rebut that evidence, and Motley failed to
127
offer any additional support to sufficiently explain the discrepancy.
The court also noted that Cleveland only applies to context-related legal
conclusions and that any contradictions of purely factual assertions can be
128
estopped.
The dissent agreed with the standard used by the majority, but concluded there was enough evidence to allow the claim to continue. 129 Specifically, Motley continued to work as a detective for nearly three years
after the injury. 130 The dissent also felt that too much weight was placed
122. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 165 (discussing Cleveland). The court stated:
Cleveland noted that her initial statements were "made in a forum that
does not consider the effect that reasonable workplace accommodations
would have on the ability to work." Obviously, this is true in all of these
cases and, if this argument alone allowed ADA plaintiffs who had previously applied for SSDI-type benefits to survive summary judgment, summary judgment could never be granted. Because the Supreme Court
indicated that summary judgment would indeed be appropriate in some
cases, an ADA plaintiff must, in certain circumstances, provide some additional rational to explain the plaintiffs apparent about-face concerning
the extent of the injuries.
Id. (citation omitted).
123. See id. (discussing what constitutes "sufficient explanation" under
Cleveland).
124. Id. at 167.

125. Id.
126. See id. at 165-66 (showing plaintiff must be able to prove he or she is

"qualified individual" and capable of performing "the essential functions" ofjob);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
127. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 166 (distinguishing Motley's case from Cleveland
because Cleveland did not offer additional support for discrepancies).
128. See id. at 164 (noting Cleveland is limited to apparently contradictory legal
conclusions, "namely, 'I am disabled for purpose of the [disability statute] "'). Pure
factual assertions fall under previous case law and are prohibited under judicial
estoppel. See id. at 167 (noting purely factual findings can be estopped); Mitchell

v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6-8 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing Cleveland and judicial estoppel).

129. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 168 (agreeing that judicial estoppel no longer applies, just summary judgment).
130. See id. at 170 n.6 (noting evidence that Motley performed detective duties in "superior fashion").
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on the medical board.1 3 1 Most important, the dissent felt that the plaintiff
was not given the opportunity to offer other explanations for the inconsistencies. The dissent would have remanded the case and allowed Motley to
argue other reasons for the inconsistent statements that would be consistent with the standards set out by the court.'3 2 Remanding the case would
have been consistent with the action taken by the Supreme Court in
33
Cleveland.1
IV.

ANALYsis AND PRACTrrIONER'S GUIDE

Commentators have noted that the different pre-Cleveland uses of judicial estoppel among the circuits will indicate how the varying courts will
determine whether a plaintiff has offered a sufficient explanation for the
inconsistent statements after Cleveland.'5 4 Courts like the Third Circuit,
which previously had a strict defendant-friendly standard, will look closely
at whether a plaintiff has offered a sufficient explanation for the inconsistency. 13 5 Motley clearly established that the Third Circuit requires ajustifi36
cation that goes beyond a mere difference in statutory standards.'
The first step practitioners should take in cases where an ADA plaintiff has previously claimed to be disabled is to examine the application for
disability benefits. 137 The tests under Motley and Cleveland apply to several
types of disability programs.' 38 SSI, SSDI, workers' compensation or any

type of long-term disability benefits will trigger this analysis.'

39

In examin-

131. See id. at 171 n.8 (noting differences in statutory standards diminishes
weight of medical board's finding).
132. See id. at 169 (believing remand case would be proper).
133. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 807 (1999) (remanding case).
134. See Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 666 (noting that implication of
prior cases and divergent circuit views will effect application of Cleveland); see also
Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopting
Cleveland but distinguishing case because inconsistent statement was purely factual
statement); Feldman v. American Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 789 (7th Cir.
1999) (adopting Cleveland while upholding summary judgment because plaintiff
failed to sufficiently explain inconsistencies); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc.,
188 F.3d 944, 955 (8th Cir. 1999) (allowing plaintiff's claim to continue);Jammer
v. School Dist., No. 978663, 1999 WL 1073688 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1999)
(granting summary judgment after Cleveland because of analysis used in Motley).
135. See, e.g., Motley, 196 F.3d at 166 (requiring more than difference in statutory standards for sufficient explanations).
136. See id. (applying United States Supreme Court rule); see also Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Cleveland case in
different context); Donahue v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 476, 479-80
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (refusing to dismiss plaintiffs claim because plaintiff offered sufficient explanation).
137. See Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 332 (giving practical guide to attorneys facing problem).
138. See id. at 331 (indicating analysis applies beyond Social Security benefits).
139. See id. (discussing other contexts in which summary judgment issue of
inconsistent statements arise); see also Motley, 196 F.3d at 164 (applying analysis
beyond SSDI benefits to disability retirement program for police officers); EEOC,
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ing the disability application, practitioners should determine what the individual has actually claimed. 1 40 The case law is binding only when an
individual has claimed a "total and permanent" inability to work.1 4 1 If a
plaintiff has not made such a significant statement, then there is no inconsistency with subsequently claiming to be a "qualified individual ... who
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
1 42
functions of the job."
Once the previous statement by the plaintiff is of such a nature that
there is at least an apparent conflict, then the statutory standards need to
be examined. 143 Normally the standards will be different because a benefits program does not take into account whether the plaintiff "could perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodations." 144 The difference will need to be articulated to support the notion that the two statutes and statements can coexist side by
side. 14 5 After Motley, the different standards alone will not sufficiently justify the apparent inconsistencies between the statements, but it is never146
theless necessary to articulate to a court why the statutes can coexist.
The next step is to look at how the application for the benefits actually occurred. 147 If the plaintiff was "merely checking the boxes" on a
form, then there is probably a basis for surviving summary judgment and
letting the fact finder determine the ADA claim.14 8 If, however, there are
supra note 3, 5418-24 (analyzing several types of disability programs and their similar effect on ADA claims).
140. See Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 332 ("Determine if there appears to
be any discrepancies between claims made on the application and the [applicant's] contention that s/he is 'qualified.'").
141. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 163 (showing plaintiff had previously claimed to
be "permanently and totally disabled ... and ... physically incapacitated for the
performance of his usual duties").

142. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
143. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S 802-05 (1999) (explaining how Social Security and ADA statutes differ in statutory definitions).
144. See id. at 802-03 (discussing difference in statutory definitions); EEOC,
supra note 3, at 1518-24 (discussing how statutory standards of Social Security Act,
workers' compensation laws and disability benefits programs differ from ADA).
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1) (1994) (defining disability under Social Security
Act), with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (requiring analysis into "reasonable accommodation" in defining "qualified individual" under ADA).
145. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802 (discussing why statutes do not "inherently
conflict"); Feldman v. American Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.
1999) (discussing Supreme Court's justifications for why statutes can coexist); Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 332 (giving practical advice).
146. See, e.g., Motley, 196 F.3d at 165 (noting difference in standards alone is
not sufficient to explain inconsistencies).
147. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 804 (discussing generalizations of SSDI applications to insure administrative efficiency).
148. See Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 332 ("[1]n finding a [plaintiff] to be
'qualified,' greater weight should be given to a [plaintiff's] narrative description of
his/her disability and ability to work on a benefits application form than information captured when a [plaintiff] checked off a box.").
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very fact specific allegations made by the plaintiff, another explanation
must be offered. 149 Checking boxes will likely occur if the previous statement was made on a Social Security application. 150 The "listed" disabilities (i.e., AIDS) do not require any fact-specific analysis. 1 5 1 The individual
automatically receives the benefit, and there is no analysis into that person's level of incapacity or actual work duties. 152 This distinction was what
prevented the plaintiff in Motley from succeeding. 153 He made detailed
descriptions of the severity of his injuries. 154 Also, he had a medical diag55
nosis that he was incapable of performing the duties of a police officer.1
A plaintiff whose ADA claim is based on an allegation that the employer denied a request for reasonable accommodation will have a strong
argument to survive summary judgement.15 6 A plaintiff who simply alleges a wrongful termination or an unlawful denial of promotion will have
a weaker argument. 157 If the plaintiff's cause of action is based specifically
149. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 166 (distinguishing case because plaintiff "offered
detailed descriptions of his injuries and their impact on his ability to work"). The
court noted, "to the extent that Motley now wishes to contest the purely factual
findings regarding his physical condition, as opposed to conclusions that he was
completely disabled for purposes of working as a state police officer, Cleveland
does not even apply and Motley may be precluded from asserting such a claim."
Id. at 167; see Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802-05 (barring judicial estoppel for fact-based
legal conclusions, but allowing it for pure factual assertions); Mitchell v. Washington Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6-8 (7th Cir. 1999) (stressing Clevelands rejection
of judicial estoppel is not extended to purely factual assertions).
150. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1999) (describing how Social Security Administration shall determine validity of benefits applications).
151. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.00(D) (1999) (listing HIV
infection as example of "listed" disability).
152. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (allowing automatic granting of SSDI benefits if applicant has "listed" disability).
153. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 160 (discussing plaintiffs clear claims that he had
.extremely painful recurring headaches and intense back pain . . . and could not
stand on [his left knee] without pain").
154. See id. (discussing plaintiffs failure to explain earlier statements of
disability).
155. See id. at 163 ("The medical board concurred [with Motley's assertion]
and found Motley was totally and permanently incapacitated for State Police Officer duties.").
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (giving examples of reasonable accommodations); Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 333 (discussing guide to issue). If the
plaintiff were forced to leave his or her job because of the employer's failure to
make one of these reasonable accommodations, then his or her application for
benefits is consistent with the subsequent ADA claim. See id. at 333 (giving "job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment
or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations" as examples
of reasonable accommodations); see also Pyrcz v. Branford College, No. 981365,
1999 WL 706882, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 26, 1999) (distinguishing case from
Cleveland because plaintiff had not alleged failure to reasonably accommodate).
157. See Motley, 526 U.S. 795, 802-04 (finding plaintiff failed to offer sufficient
explanation to defeat summary judgment).
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on the employer's refusal to accommodate him or her, then his or her
subsequent application for disability payments is understandable. 158 The
individual was incapable of work, but only because of the employer's ADA
159
violation.
Finally, practitioners should determine if the plaintiff's condition has
worsened over time. 160 For example, the two claims can be reconciled if
the employment decision that gave rise to the ADA claim occurred at one
time, and then later the employee's condition worsened to the point
where, at that subsequent time, he or she needed disability benefits. 161
The ADA plaintiff is seeking a remedy for a time when he did not feel he
162
was disabled enough to necessitate benefits.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has settled the issue of which test
courts should use to determine whether an ADA claim is barred by a prior
admission of disability.' 63 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has applied this test rather strictly in accordance with its
history of judicially estopping such claims.' 64 Practitioners dealing with
inconsistent statements should look to the examples given by the court
regarding what constitutes a sufficient explanation in order to survive sum65
mary judgment.1
John Bisordi
158. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (explaining
why ADA claim can be consistent with SSDI application for disability).
159. See D'Aprile v. Fleet Serv. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (giving example of individual having to quit job because of employer's refusal to reasonably
accommodate her disability).
160. See Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 333 ("[A] statement about the [plaintiff's] disability on a benefits application might not reflect his/her ability to perform the essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, at the
time of the Respondent's employment decision.").
161. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807 (discussing plaintiff's contention that SSDI
statements were true at time they were made); Motley, 196 F.3d at 165 (distinguishing case from Cleveland where plaintiffs additional explanation was that her condition had worsened over time).
162. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. 807 (stating plaintiff's claim that at time of employment decision giving rise to ADA cause of action she was capable of working,
though she was not at time of her subsequent SSDI application).
163. See id. ("To defeat summary judgment, that explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or
plaintiff's good faith belief in the earlier statement the plaintiff could nonetheless
'perform the essential functions' of her job, with or without 'reasonable
accommodation."').
164. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 165 (requiring more explanation than mere difference in statutory standards).
165. See id. at 165, 167 (noting change in condition and blanket statements
may be sufficient explanations).
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